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ABSTRACT
Work was one of the central motivations for welfare reform during the 1990s. One important
rationale for work was based on human capital theory: work today should raise experience tomorrow,
which in turn should raise future wage offers and reduce dependency on aid. Despite the importance
of the this notion, few studies have estimated the effect of welfare reform on wages. Furthermore,
several recent analyses suggest that low-skill workers, such as welfare recipients, enjoy only meager
returns to experience, undermining the link between welfare reform and wages.
An important analytical obstacle is the sample selection problem. Since non-employment levels are
high and workers are unlikely to represent a random sample from the population of former recipients,
estimates that fail to account for sample selection could be seriously biased.
In this paper, I propose a method to solve the selection problem based on the use of reservation wage
data. Reservation wage data allow one to solve the problem using censored regression methods.
Furthermore, the use of reservation wage data obviates the need for the controversial exclusion
restrictions sometimes used to identify familiar two-step sample selection estimators.
Correcting for sample selection bias matters a great deal empirically. Estimates from models that
lack such corrections suggest that welfare recipients gain little from work experience. Estimates
based on the reservation wage approach suggest that they enjoy returns similar to those estimated
from other samples of workers. They also suggest that the particular reform program that I analyze
may have raised wages modestly.
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I. Introduction 
  Promoting work was one of the primary rationales for welfare reform.  One of the 
key arguments for work came from human capital theory.  The notion was that work 
today would increase experience in the future, that increased experience would increase 
future wage offers, and that higher wages would reduce future welfare dependency.  
Many welfare agencies adopted the slogan “a job, a better job, a career” to convey this 
notion to their clients.  
  Despite the apparent policy interest in wage growth, little research has focused on 
the link between welfare reform and wages.  Whereas over two dozen studies have 
estimated the effect of reform on work, with all but a few showing that reform increased 
employment (Grogger and Karoly 2005), only a handful have estimated the effect of 
reform on wages.  Most of these studies analyze accepted wage distributions among 
workers in welfare reform experiments (Bloom et al., 2002; Card, Michalopoulos, and 
Robins, 2001).  Since accepted wages are drawn from self-selected samples of workers, 
however, these analyses may not identify the effect of reform on the offered wages. 
  Complicating matters further, welfare reform has theoretically ambiguous effects 
on accepted wages.  Most reform policies involve some combination of work 
requirements, time limits, and lower tax rates on recipients’ earnings.  All of these 
policies could lead recipients to accept lower wages than they would have otherwise.  
Without adequate controls for such self-selection, reform could appear to reduce wages, 
at least in the short term.  Whether reform increases wages in the longer term depends on 
the extent to which recipients’ wages rise with experience.   2 
  Although wages rise with experience in the standard human capital model, there 
is debate over whether the standard human capital model applies to low-skill workers 
such as welfare recipients.  Although some recent studies suggest that wages rise with 
experience similarly among low- and high-skill workers (Gladden and Taber 1999; Loeb 
and Corcoran 2001), other studies suggest that low-skill workers enjoy little of the wage 
growth experienced by their higher-skill counterparts (Burtless 1995, Edin and Lein 
1997, Moffitt and Rangarajan 1989, Pavetti and Acs 1997; Card and Hyslop 2004; 
Dustmann and Meghir 2005).  Yet the extent to which wages grow with experience is a 
critical determinant of whether welfare reform will increase offered wages. 
  My objectives in this paper are to estimate the effects of a welfare reform program 
on wages roughly four years after the program began and to estimate the return to 
experience among welfare recipients.  As suggested already, a major obstacle in this 
analysis is sample selection bias.  As in many other contexts, a simple model of labor 
force participation indicates that the unobservable characteristics of consumers that 
influence wages also influence labor force participation (Heckman 1974).  In the case of 
welfare recipients, the potential for bias would seem particularly great, since even after 
welfare reform, only about two-thirds of former recipients are likely to be working at any 
point in time (Isaacs and Lyon 2000).  This means that wages are unobserved for one-
third of the sample, so if there is positive selection into employment, a simple linear 
regression of wages on experience could result in biased estimates of the return to 
experience. 
  To solve the sample selection problem, I propose a novel approach based on 
reservation wage data.  In a simple model of labor force participation, the consumer will   3 
work if her offered wage exceeds her reservation wage, that is, her shadow price of 
leisure.  This means that with data on reservation wages, the analyst can solve the 
selection problem by means of a censored bivariate regression model, where the 
reservation wages provide censoring thresholds for consumers who do not work.  One 
advantage of this approach is that it does not require the potentially controversial 
exclusion restrictions often employed to identify the more familiar two-equation sample-
selection estimators (Heckman 1979). 
  The reservation wage data are fortuitously available from the evaluation of a 
Florida welfare reform experiment.  However, because they were collected in an effort to 
value employer-provided health care, the questions used to obtain them involve 
complexities that do not necessarily contribute to the elicitation of the textbook notion of 
a reservation wage.  Perhaps due to this complexity, the reservation wage data appear to 
involve a substantial amount of measurement error. 
  To deal with this problem I extend the econometric model to account for 
measurement error.  The resulting estimator still takes the form of a censored bivariate 
regression.  However, the measurement error affects which observations are treated as 
limit observations and which are treated as non-limit observations.   
  Accounting for selection bias has important effects on the results.  Simple linear 
regressions yield very small returns to experience.  Standard two-step sample-selection 
estimators differ little from OLS because the instrument used to identify the wage 
equation is fairly weak.  Using reservation wages to correct for selection bias, however, 
yields returns that are comparable to those observed in other samples of young workers.    4 
The estimated effect of the reform program on wages is imprecise, but it suggests that the 
program may have increased wages. 
  In the next section I discuss the data, after which I discuss estimation in section 
III.  I present results in section IV.  In the conclusion, I discuss the estimation method as 
well as the results.  Although the estimator I employ was developed to solve the selection 
problem in a specific context, the approach could be used more generally if reservation 
wage data were collected more widely.  I discuss how the quality of such data might be 
improved, particularly if recent developments in survey techniques were employed to 
collect it. 
II. Data 
  My data come from the evaluation of Florida’s Family Transition Program (FTP),  
which was a pilot welfare reform program carried out in Escambia County (Pensacola).  
FTP involved a random-assignment evaluation.  Between May 1994 and February 1995, 
ongoing welfare recipients were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups at 
their biannual recertification interviews.  Applicants were randomly assigned at the time 
of application.  Bloom et al. (2000) provides details about the program’s evaluation as 
well as its effects on employment, earnings, and income. 
  FTP’s treatment group was subject to time limits and a financial incentive.  Most 
recipients could receive aid for only 24 months in any 60-month period, although more 
disadvantaged recipients could receive aid for 36 out of 72 months.  Control group 
members were not subject to a time limit.  Working treatment group members could keep 
the first $200 they earned each month, as well as 50 percent of the amount over $200.  
Working control group members faced the tax schedule from the Aid to Families with   5 
Dependent Children program.  After the first four months of work, their marginal tax rate 
on earnings was 100 percent if they earned over $90 per month.  Both the time limit and 
the financial incentive provided treatment group members with an incentive to work.   
  In addition, the treatment group was subject to different asset limits and parental 
responsibility requirements than the control group.  Furthermore, both groups were 
subject to work requirements that required recipients either to work or to participate in a 
welfare-to-work program.  The welfare-to-work programs for both groups followed a 
work-first model which focused on job search rather than skills-building, but the 
programs were administered somewhat differently.  The link between these differences 
and employment is less clear than that between time limits, financial incentives, and 
employment. 
  Survey data collected four years after random assignment provide information on 
wages and reservation wages.  Of the 2,815 recipients in the “report sample” analyzed by 
Bloom, et al. (2000), 2,160 were targeted for the four-year survey.  Questionnaires were 
completed by 1,729 recipients, yielding a completion rate of 80 percent.  The four-year 
survey collected information about employment, earnings, and hours at the time of the 
survey.  I used these data to compute hourly wages.  The survey also collected 
information on reservation wages, which I discuss in detail below. 
  In addition to the survey data, I use data from administrative sources.  These 
sources provide monthly data on welfare receipt and quarterly data on earnings covered 
by the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system during a six-year observation window that 
begins two years prior to random assignment and extends through the time of the four-
year survey.  The UI system covers roughly 90 percent of all jobs in the U.S., although it   6 
excludes self employment, some government jobs, and independent contractors (Bureau 
of Labor Statistics 1989).  It misses casual employment paid in cash, which may be an 
important source of income for welfare recipients (Edin and Lein 1997).  To measure 
labor force experience, I sum the number of quarters with UI-covered earnings during the 
six-year observation window.  Using such an actual experience measure to estimate the 
return to experience raises an endogeneity issue, since actual experience is a function of 
past employment decisions (Gladden and Taber 2000).  I discuss my approach to this 
problem in section III. 
  The first two columns of Table 1 compare summary statistics from the report 
sample and the survey sample.  Both samples exhibit characteristics familiar from other 
studies of welfare populations.  They are relatively young, poorly educated, and 
disproportionately non-white.  Fewer than 15 percent of women in both samples received 
welfare in the 48th month after entering the program.   
  Average experience during the six-year observation window was 9.8 quarters in 
the report sample and 10.52 quarters in the survey sample.  Although there are no data on 
experience prior to the observation window, it is useful to roughly estimate prior 
experience in order to compare my results below to previous estimates from the literature.  
Bloom et al. (2000) report that average age in the sample was 29.1 years at the time of 
random assignment, or 27.1 years at the beginning of the observation window.  Average 
years of education were 11.1 years.
1  Assuming that one completes 11th grade at the age 
of 17, I infer that sample members had been out of school for 10.1 years on average at the 
beginning of the observation window.   
                                                 
1  Neither exact age nor exact years of education are available in the public-use data that I use in this 
analysis.   7 
  The average employment rate in the two years prior to random assignment was 
0.26.  Assuming that employment rate applies to the pre-observation period, that is, the 
period prior to the beginning of the six-year observation window, implies that pre-
observation experience averaged about 2.6 years.  One might be concerned that this 
employment rate understates earlier experience, since many of the women in the sample, 
particularly the ongoing recipients, were on aid during the two years prior to random 
assignment.  Applicants to the program, who spent less time on aid before random 
assignment than ongoing recipients, had an average employment rate of 0.29 during the 
two years before they applied for aid.
2  Using this higher employment rate implies that 
pre-observation experience averaged about 2.9 years.
3  Adding this to mean experience 
during the observation window suggests that average lifetime experience at the time of 
the four-year survey was roughly 5 to 6 years.   
  The next row of the Table shows that roughly half the sample was working four 
years after random assignment; the survey sample is somewhat more likely than the 
report sample to have positive UI earnings in the 16th quarter following random 
assignment.  Within the survey sample, the difference between UI-covered employment 
and self-reported employment is fairly small as compared to other samples of former 
welfare recipients, where casual employment often results in differences of 10 to 20 
percentage points (Isaacs and Lyon, 2000).   
                                                 
2  The term "applicant" applies to anyone who applied for aid during the period of random assignment.  
Many had received aid during previous spells.  Such cycling on and off the rolls is common among welfare 
recipients 
3  One might be concerned that employment exhibits an "Ashenfelter dip," that is, a sharp decrease just 
before random assignment.  Such a dip could cause me to underestimate pre-observation experience.  
However, no such dip occurred; sample employment rates were generally rising during the two years prior 
to random assignment.   8 
  Because the reservation wage data were used to value employer-provided health 
coverage, the questions were posed to all members of the survey sample rather than just 
to non-workers.  Of the 1,729 members of the sample survey, 1,548, or 89.5 percent, 
provided responses to the reservation wage question.  The third column of Table 1 shows 
that this reservation-wage sample is generally similar to the survey sample as a whole, 
with the exception that its employment rate and labor market experience are somewhat 
higher.  This is the sample that will be used in estimating the censored regression models 
discussed in the next section below.   
  Of the 1,548 members of the reservation wage sample, 959 worked, for an 
employment rate of 62 percent.  This employment sample had greater levels of 
observable skill than those who were not working, as seen in column (4).  Whereas nearly 
39 percent of the reservation wage sample lacked both a diploma and a GED, only 33 
percent of the employment sample had no high school credential.  The employment 
sample also had considerably more work experience, having accumulated 13 quarters as 
compared to 10.9 in the reservation wage sample.   
  The next row of the Table shows that mean wages among workers are $7.15 per 
hour.  Figure 1 presents further data on wages in the form of kernel density estimates of 
wage distributions estimated separately for the treatment and control groups.  As 
compared to the control group density, the treatment group density has less mass in the 
range of about $6 to $6.50 an hour (corresponding to log wages of 1.79 to 1.87) and more 
in the range of $10 an hour (corresponding to a log wage of 2.3).  The figure suggests that 
FTP helped some workers escape the “$6 ghetto” for somewhat better paying work.     9 
  Of course, Figure 1 compares wages among workers.  If workers differ from non-
workers along unobservable dimensions in the same way that they differ along 
observable dimensions, the result could be sample selection bias.  I account for sample 
selection bias using reservation wage data that were elicited by the first of the following 
pair of questions:  
1.  Suppose that next month you were unemployed and had no 
medical benefits, and someone offered you a full-time job with 
employer-paid full medical benefits.  What is the lowest wage per 
hour that the employer could offer and still get you to take the job? 
 
2.  Suppose that next month you were unemployed and had no 
medical benefits, and someone offered you a full-time job with no 
employer-paid health benefits.  What is the lowest wage per hour 
that the employer could offer and still get you to take the job? 
 
  The question is clearly quite challenging, requiring the respondent to evaluate a 
scenario which may be quite at odds from her current situation.  Although the non-
workers could presumably evaluate with relative ease the unemployment condition 
stipulated by the question, such an evaluation would presumably be more difficult for the 
62 percent of recipients who were currently working.  Furthermore, the condition 
regarding the lack of health benefits in the second question involved another hypothetical 
scenario for the 60 percent of the sample members who currently had health coverage 
(and possibly for the 85 percent of sample whose children had coverage).  This additional 
level of complexity was likely to pose particular difficulties for the majority that was 
covered by Medicaid, which would have continued to provide coverage even in the event 
of a job loss.  Since the second question is substantially more complex than the first, I 
restrict my attention to the first in the analysis below.   10 
  Given the complexities of the questionnaire items, one might reasonably be 
concerned about the quality of the responses, or whether the questions seemed so 
hypothetical that respondents failed to take them seriously. There are a few ways to 
gauge the quality of these data.  The first is to note that the value of health insurance 
implied by responses to the two questions averages $1.03 per hour, or about $2000 per 
year at full-time work.  This value accords at least roughly with the price of health 
insurance policies, which one would not have expected if respondents had treated the 
questions dismissively. 
  Second, since the question was posed to workers, one can compare workers’ 
reservation wages to their reported wages.  At the aggregate level, the reservation wages 
seem sensible, as shown in Table 2.  They are generally low, in line with the wages 
typically paid to low-skill workers.  Except at the very bottom of the wage distribution, 
where many wage reports fall beneath the federal minimum wage, wages exceed 
reservation wages, at least weakly, as theory requires.   
  However, comparing individual reports reveals a number of discrepancies, that is, 
observations where workers report reservation wages in excess of their current wage.  
Although nearly two-thirds of workers reported a wage that at least weakly exceeded 
their reservation wage, a sizeable minority reported the contrary. 
  These discrepancies could result from misreporting of either wages or reservation 
wages.  Roughly 25 percent of the discrepant observations involved wage reports below 
the federal minimum wage.  Other discrepancies involved reservation wages that 
exceeded the current wage by a small even amount, such as 25 cents, or that appeared to 
represent “rounding up” to such an amount, for example, from $5.15 to 5.50.  One   11 
possibility is that, despite the prefatory language in the questionnaire, these respondents 
reported the wage at which they would be willing to leave their current job.  Another is 
that respondents interpreted the question as asking about the wage they might expect 
under the circumstances given.  Dominitz (1998) has shown that survey respondents’ 
reports of earnings expectations are generally optimistic when compared to future 
realizations. 
  Whatever the reason for the discrepancies, it is clear that they need to be 
accounted for in order to use the reservation wage data to deal with the sample selection 
problem.  To do this, I assume that both the wage and the reservation wage are measured 
with error.  I then derive the likelihood for the sample of error-laden data.  This is akin to 
the approach taken in some structural search models, where measurement error is 
invoked to rationalize observations that run contrary to theory, such as job changes that 
involve wage reductions or accepted wages that fall below stated reservation wages (van 
den Berg 1990, Flinn 2002, Dey and Flinn 2005). 
  One further cause for concern is that the reservation wage question asks for the 
wage at which the respondent would be willing to work full-time.  This is at odds with 
the textbook notion of a reservation wage, which is the wage at which the consumer 
would be willing to work one hour.  Given the other complexities of the question, one 
might wonder how salient the full-time condition was to the survey respondents.  Since 
we will never know, I present one set of estimates below based on the assumption that the 
condition was salient, that is, that respondents indeed reported the wage necessary to 
induce them to work full-time.  However, for the analysis that follows in the next section,   12 
I treat the responses to the question as if the full-time language was not salient, that is, as 
if they reflected respondents’ shadow price of leisure. 
III. Estimation 
  Before dealing with the problem of measurement error, I first briefly develop the 
singly-censored bivariate regression model in its absence.  This allows me to discuss 
most simply how using reservation wages as censoring thresholds can solve the sample 
selection problem.  I also discuss the restrictive conditions under which solving the 
selection problem also solves the problem of endogenous labor market experience. 
  A. No measurement error 
  The wage and reservation wage equations are given by  
i i i i u Z X w 1 1 1 1
* + + = d b                 (1) 
i i i i u Z X r 2 2 2 2
* + + = d b                 (2) 
where 
*
i w  denotes the logarithm of consumer i’s wage and 
*
i r  denotes the logarithm of 
the consumer’s reservation wage, both measured without error.  The vector X1i includes a 
vector of characteristics known to influence wages, such as education, race, and the 
number of children.  In some of the regressions below, Zi represents the treatment-group 
dummy, equal to one for members of the treatment sample and equal to zero for members 
of the control sample.  In these regressions, ￿1 gives the effect of FTP on wages at the 
time of the four-year survey.  In other regressions, Zi represents the labor market 
experience measure discussed above.  In these regressions, ￿1 gives the returns to 
experience.  In this case, the assumption that returns are linear in experience is justified 
by the concentrated age distribution of the sample and is supported empirically.  The 
vector X2i includes characteristics thought to influence the consumer’s reservation wages.    13 
The vectors X1i and X2i may differ, although they need not, and in this application they 
include the same variables.  Employing the reservation wage data in the manner 
described below eliminates the need for the often-controversial exclusion restrictions 
typically used to identify self-selection models.  The terms u1i and u2i  represent 
unobservable factors that influence wages and reservation wages, respectively.  The term 
u1i captures unobservable labor market productivity.  The term u2i reflects unobservables 
that affect the shadow price of time.  It may also reflect respondents’ beliefs about the 
non-wage characteristics of potential jobs.  I assume that X1i, X2i, and Zi and are 
uncorrelated with u1i and u2i.  This assumption is justified in the case where Zi represents 
the treatment group dummy.  Below I discuss how I deal with the potential endogeneity 
of past experience.   I assume that u1i and u2i follow a bivariate normal distribution. 
  A simple model of labor force participation says that the consumer works if her 
wage (weakly) exceeds her shadow price of leisure, that is, if  
* *
i i r w ³ .                    (3) 
This model yields what I refer to as a singly-censored bivariate regression estimator, 
where the reservation wages serve as censoring thresholds for non-workers.   
  In deriving the likelihood, there are two groups to consider: workers, who 
contribute non-limit observations, and non-workers, who contribute limit observations.  
The bivariate density term contributed by workers, for whom
* *
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   14 
where  ) , ( 2 1 i i u u f  is the bivariate normal pdf.  The density for these non-limit 
observations is given by the product of two terms: the probability that the wage (weakly) 
exceeds the reservation wage and the conditional joint density of the disturbance terms, 
given that the wage exceeds the reservation wage.  The right-hand side of the first line 
above simply uses equation (1) to re-write the left-hand side.  The second line follows 
from the first via standard results on the truncated bivariate normal density (Johnson and 
Kotz, not dated, 112).  Because the conditional joint density takes the convenient form 
given in the second line, the likelihood for the ith non-limit observation takes the simple 
form given in the third line. 
  The contribution to the likelihood for non-workers, for whom 
* *
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  Under certain conditions, this model solves not only the sample selection 
problem, but also the endogeneity problem that arises because experience represents the 
summation of past employment decisions.  As I show in the appendix, these conditions 
are restrictive: they require reservation wages, and all determinants of the wage except 
for experience, to be time-invariant.  In this case, the consumer will either work in all 
periods of her life or in none.  Her entire career trajectory depends on whether she works   15 
in the first period of her working life.  Conditional on that first decision, employment is 
deterministic, so experience is conditionally exogenous.  Solving the selection problem 
for the first period implicitly solves the endogeneity problem, but since the consumer’s 
employment decision is the same in every period, solving the selection problem in any 
period (including the period four years after random assignment) is equivalent to solving 
it in the first period.  Although these conditions are too restrictive to be realistic, they 
suggest that if the variables that determine employment (other than experience) are 
dominated by time-invariant components, then solving the selection problem may help 
mitigate the endogeneity problem that arises from including actual experience as a 
regressor, even though it does not completely solve it.   
  Under more realistic conditions, the endogeneity problem may require an explicit 
solution.  In the empirical work below, I use the treatment-group dummy as an instrument 
for experience.  The treatment dummy should provide a valid instrument, because FTP 
provided an incentive to work for the treatment group and assignment to treatment was 
made at random.  Following Newey (1987) (see also Blundell and Smith 1986), I first 
regress experience on the treatment group dummy and the other exogenous variables in 
the model, then include the residuals from this first-stage regression in the singly-
censored bivariate regression model.  This is analogous to Hausman’s (1978) linear IV 
estimate, with the result that the coefficient on the experience residual should provide a 
test of the null hypothesis of no misspecification against the alternative of endogenous 
experience, accounting for self-selection.     16 
  B. Measurement error 
  To account for measurement error, let observed (log) wages and reservation 
wages be given by 
i i i w w e + =
*                     (4) 
and 
i i i v r r + =
*                     (5) 
where ￿i ~N(0,
2
e s ) and vi ~N(0,
2
v s ) may be correlated with each other but are assumed 
to be independent of X1i, X2i, Zi, u1i, and u2i.  The observable wage and reservation wage 
equations are:  
i i i i Z X w 1 1 1 1 h d b + + =                 (6) 
i i i i Z X r 2 2 2 2 h d b + + =                 (7) 
where  i i i u e h + = 1 1  and  i i i u n h + = 2 2 .  I assume that ￿1i and ￿2i follow a bivariate 
normal distribution with zero means, variances  2
1 s and  2
2 s , respectively, and correlation 
coefficient ￿. 
  The full-information likelihood for this model consists of three equations: 
equations (6) and (7) and an employment equation derived by substituting (1) into (3) and 
solving.  The apparent advantage of the full-information likelihood is that it uses all the 
data on observed wages and reservation wages, plus the information on employment 
status, which according to (3) is a function of the true wage and reservation wage rather 
than their observed counterparts.  The problem with it is that it is not identified.  The 
three-by-three covariance matrix involves six parameters, whereas there are only four 
moments available to identify them.  Fortunately, one can write down a limited-  17 
information likelihood function where all the regression parameters in equations (1) and 
(2) are identified, as is the two-by-two covariance matrix of the  ji h  terms.   
  In deriving the limited-information likelihood there are two groups to consider.  
As in the simple case without measurement error, the groups correspond to the limit and 
non-limit observations.  However, in the presence of measurement error, the key is to 
note that only workers who report  i i r w ³  can be treated as non-limit observations.  All 
other observations, that is, both non-workers and workers with discrepant wage reports, 
must be treated as limit observations.  Wage reports from the discrepant observations are 
not utilized in this approach, which is why I refer to the result as a limited-information 
likelihood. 
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This is again a singly-censored bivariate regression model, albeit with a different 
definition of the limit and non-limit observations. 
  A natural question is why the full set of workers cannot be treated as non-limit 
observations in the presence of measurement error.  The reason is that to do so would 
require one to account for the fact that employment decisions are based on equation (3), 
whereas the observed model is given by equations (6) and (7).  Thus the density 
associated with workers in the presence of measurement error is given by  
) , (











i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
f
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h h
d b h h d b h h
¹
- - ³ - - ³ = ³ ³
 
The problem is that employment, the conditioning event, is a function of the true wage 
and reservation wage, whereas the data consist of the observable, error-laden wage and 
reservation wage.  As a result, the conditional joint density on the right-hand side of the 
first line above cannot be rewritten in the same convenient manner as could the 
conditional joint density in the model without measurement error.  The second line above 
shows that simply treating all the workers as non-limit observations is likely to yield 
inconsistent estimates, since the contribution to the likelihood that one would attribute to 
such observations would be incorrect. 
IV. Results 
  A. The Effect of FTP on Wages 
  Estimates of the effect of the FTP program on wages are presented in Table 3.  
The first column reports results from an ordinary least squares regression of log wages on 
the FTP treatment dummy, age dummies, education dummies, a race dummy, and the 
number of children.  Although there is no reason to expect these estimates to have   19 
desirable properties, I present them for purposes of comparison with the singly-censored 
bivariate regression model.  They represent the estimates one would obtain if one were to 
ignore the sample selection problem altogether. 
  The coefficient on the treatment dummy is negative and insignificant.  By itself, 
this estimate gives little reason to think that FTP had much effect on wages at the four-
year mark.  As for the other estimates in the model, most are consistent with expectations.  
Although the age dummies are insignificant, the education variables have strong and 
significant effects, and the non-white dummy is negative and significant.  The coefficient 
on the number of children is negative and significant, but small. 
  The next two columns present estimates from Heckman' s (1979) two-step 
procedure to adjust for selectivity bias.  Column (2) presents estimates from a probit 
model estimated from the full reservation wage sample including both workers and non-
workers.  The dependent variable is an employment dummy equal to one if the consumer 
is employed at the four-year survey and equal to zero otherwise.  Column (3) presents the 
estimated wage equation, which includes the inverse Mills'  ratio from the employment 
probit to correct for sample selection bias.  Since the same variables are included in both 
the wage and employment equations, identification is via function form alone.  One 
would not expect such a model to perform very well, but absent a plausible exclusion 
restriction or data on reservation wages, this is the type of model to which one might 
resort in attempt to deal with selectivity bias.   
  In the employment equation, the treatment dummy has little effect on employment 
status at the four-year mark, even though the treatment group worked significantly more 
than the control group during the first three years of the experiment (Bloom et al., 2000).    20 
Otherwise the estimates largely accord with expectations.  In the wage equation, the 
coefficient on the treatment dummy is positive but it is small and dwarfed by its standard 
error.  Indeed, the standard errors on all the coefficients are quite high.  This is likely due 
to collinearity with the inverse Mills'  ratio, since the model is identified solely on the 
basis of functional form.   
  Columns (4) and (5) report results from the singly-censored bivariate regression 
model described above.  The coefficients in the wage equation are generally estimated 
more precisely than their counterparts from the Heckman two-step estimator.  The 
coefficient on the treatment-group dummy in the wage equation suggests that FTP raised 
wages by 3.7 percent four years after the program began.  The t-statistic is 1.81, which 
means that the estimate is significant at the 10 percent level but not at the five percent 
level.   
  The coefficient on the treatment-group dummy in the reservation wage equation is 
positive, suggesting that FTP slightly but insignificantly raised recipients’ reservation 
wages by the time of the four-year follow-up.  Although one might have expected the 
treatment and control groups to have the same shadow price of leisure on average at the 
beginning of the experiment, greater employment among the treatment group during the 
intervening four years may have led to greater accumulated earnings, raising the 
treatment group’s reservation wages.  Indeed the positive but insignificant effect of FTP 
on reservation wages is consistent with the positive but insignificant effect of the 
program on savings at the time of the four-year survey (Bloom et al., 2002, Appendix C).   
  Furthermore, the small reservation wage effect revealed in column (5) helps 
explain why the OLS estimate of the effect of FTP in column (1) is biased downward.    21 
Although FTP raised reservation wages, it raised wages by a greater amount.  As a result, 
workers in the treatment group constitute a relatively less selective sample than workers 
in the control group, imparting a negative selection bias. 
  Among the other coefficients in columns (4) and (5), age has no effect on either 
wages or reservation wages.  Schooling has strong effects on wages.  The effects of 
education on reservation wages, apparent in the no-diploma coefficient and the post-high 
school coefficient, suggest that schooling raises home productivity by less than it raises 
market productivity.  The coefficients on the non-white variable indicate that non-whites 
have lower wages and reservation wages, all else equal, than their white counterparts.  
Children reduce wages and reservation wages, though the coefficient in the reservation 
wage equation is insignificant.  The estimate of ￿ shows substantial positive correlation 
between the unobservable determinants of wages and reservation wages. 
  B. The Return to Experience 
  Linear regression estimates of the return to experience are presented in Table 4.  
As above, these estimates are reported for purpose of comparison with the censored 
regression estimates to follow.  The OLS estimate in column (1) is significant but small.  
Without controls for selection bias, one would conclude that former welfare recipients 
enjoyed little return to experience. 
  The next column reports a linear instrumental variables estimate.  Using the 
treatment group dummy as an instrument for experience may abate the problem of 
endogenous experience.  Since assignment to treatment was made at random, the 
treatment dummy should be uncorrelated with unobservable determinants of recipients’ 
wages.  However, even though assignment to treatment is random, linear instrumental   22 
variables is unlikely to solve the selection problem, since the observability of the 
recipient’s current wage depends on whether she is currently employed.  The estimate is 
negative, with a standard error an order of magnitude greater than that of the OLS 
estimate. 
  Table 5 presents two sets of selectivity-corrected estimates of the return to 
experience.  Columns (1) and (2) report the employment and wage equations, 
respectively, from Heckman' s two-step estimator.  The estimates of the employment 
equation in column (1) are identical to those reported in column (2) of Table 3; they are 
repeated here for clarity.  In this model, the treatment group dummy appears only in the 
employment equation, so in principle it contributes to the identification of the wage 
equation.  As a practical matter, however, the treatment-group dummy has only  a 
marginally significant effect on employment, limiting the extent to which it identifies the 
wage equation.   
  The estimated return to experience in column (2) is positive and significant but 
small.  In fact, it is almost identical to the OLS estimate in Table 4.  The reason is that the 
inverse Mills'  ratio is completely insignificant, with a t-statistic less than one.  If the 
model were convincingly identified, one might infer from the insignificant Mills'  ratio 
that self-selection bias was essentially absent from these data.  However, since the 
treatment dummy is only marginally significant in the employment equation, an 
alternative interpretation is that identification is weak, and as a result, the inverse Mills'  
ratio provides a poor control for sample selection bias. 
  Estimates from the censored bivariate regression model appear in columns (3) and 
(4).  Experience has positive effects on both wages and reservation wages.  The small   23 
positive effect of experience on reservation wages reported in column (4) may stem from 
the greater accumulation of earnings among the treatment group, as discussed above.  
The estimated effect of experience on wages reported in column (3) is much larger than 
the OLS estimate reported in Table 3.  This is the direction of bias one would expect, 
given the small effect of experience on reservation wages.  Experience increases 
reservation wages, but it increases wages by a greater amount.   Thus experience 
decreases the relative selectivity of the sample, negatively biasing the OLS estimate. 
  The experience coefficient on wages in column (3) is significant and its 
magnitude suggests that welfare recipients enjoy a return of roughly 5.6 percent per year 
of experience.  This is comparable to a number of other recent estimates in the literature 
that are based on samples with similar levels of experience.  Gladden and Taber (1999) 
study respondents to the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) who received 
no education beyond high school.  During their first 10 years out of school, white women 
in their sample accumulated five years of work experience and black women accumulated 
four years, on average.  This is roughly comparable to the experience level of the FTP 
sample, which I estimated above at 5 to 6 years.  Over the 10-year study period, the 
women in Gladden and Taber' s sample enjoyed returns to experience of about 4 to 5 
percent per year. 
  Loeb and Corcoran (2001) followed NLSY women from 1978, when they ranged 
in age from 14 to 21, until 1993, when they ranged between 27 and 34 years old.  By age 
27, women who had ever received welfare had accumulated an average of 3.9 years of 
experience.  Their average return to experience was 6.8 percent.  It is interesting to note 
that neither Gladden and Taber nor Loeb and Corcoran find the return to experience to   24 
vary by other measures of skill.  Gladden and Taber show that experience has similar 
effects on wages for both high school graduates and high school dropouts; Loeb and 
Corcoran report similar returns among women who had received welfare and women who 
had not received welfare. 
  Ferber and Waldfogel (1998) follow NLSY women over the same period as Loeb 
and Corcoran and estimate the return to experience to be about 5 percent.  Lynch (2001) 
also analyzes data from the NLSY.  She reports that women earn an annualized return of 
about 11 percent per year of experience during the first three years after leaving school.  
Light and Ureta (1995) analyze a sample of women from the young women' s cohort of 
the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS), which preceded the NLSY.  Their sample 
ranges in age between 16 and 39 with a mean of 25; average experience is 3 years.  They 
estimate an average return to experience of 7 percent. 
  Card, Michalopoulos, and Robins (2001), Zabel, Schwartz, and Donald (2004), 
and Card and Hyslop (2005) analyze wage data from the Self-Sufficiency Program (SSP), 
a Canadian experiment that offered welfare recipients a substantial wage subsidy if they 
were willing to leave welfare and work full-time.  When the experiment began, the SSP 
sample averaged 30 years of age and 7.4 years of lifetime work experience.  Estimates of 
the return to experience differ across these studies.  Zabel, Schwartz, and Donald report 
an estimate of 8.3 percent, whereas Card, Michalopoulos, and Robins report an estimate 
of 2 to 3 percent, and Card and Hyslop report essentially a zero return to experience.  It is 
not clear why estimates from the same experiment differ so much. 
  Moving beyond the experience coefficient, one interesting pattern in the estimates 
warrants discussion.  With the exception of an insignificant age coefficient, all of the   25 
coefficients in the wage equation are larger in absolute value than their counterparts in 
the reservation wage equation.  This is what one might expect.  Presumably, the wage 
represents the maximum value of the consumer' s time across different types of market 
activity, that is, across different types of jobs.  In contrast, the reservation wage 
represents the value of the consumer' s time in a single type of non-market activity, 
namely household production.  If so, then the return to schooling (for example) in the 
market should exceed the return to schooling in the home.  Similarly, the residual 
variation in market wages should exceed the residual variation in reservation wages, 
which is precisely what we see in the estimates of ￿1 and ￿2.
4 
  As discussed above, experience may be endogenous in this model.  Table 6 
reports two sets of estimates intended to deal with both selectivity bias and potentially 
endogenous experience.  The first extends the Heckman two-step approach to deal with 
an endogenous regressor.  The second adapts the singly-censored bivariate probit model 
along the lines of Newey (1987), as discussed in Section III above.  Both estimators make 
use of a first-stage regression of experience on the treatment dummy and the other 
exogenous regressors in the model.  This regression is based on the full reservation wage 
sample, including workers and non-workers.  Results are shown in column (1).  They 
show that FTP raised experience by about one quarter over the four-year follow-up 
period.  Education raised experience, whereas children reduced it; non-whites worked 
more than whites, all else equal. 
                                                 
4  Implicitly I am assuming that the difference between ￿1 and ￿2 primarily reflects differences between 
var(u1i) and var(u2i), rather than differences between var(￿i) and var(vi).   26 
  To modify the Heckman two-step estimator, I replace actual experience in the 
wage equation with predicted values from the first-stage experience regression.
5  There is 
no reason to expect this estimation scheme to perform well, particularly given the weak 
relationship between the treatment-group dummy and employment at the time of the four-
year survey.  I present these estimates for comparison purposes, since this is presumably 
the type of approach one might consider in order to deal with both selectivity and the 
potential endogeneity of experience in the absence of the reservation wage data. 
  The employment equation reported in column (2) is exactly the same as that 
presented in column (2) of Table 3.  As above, I report it again here for clarity.  In the 
wage equation, reported in column (3), the effect of experience is positive, although the 
coefficient is only a fraction of its standard error.  Most of the other estimates are 
similarly imprecise.  This is the result of effectively using the treatment dummy twice, 
once in the employment equation to handle self-selection, and again as an instrument for 
experience. 
  To modify the singly-censored bivariate regression model, I add the residuals 
from the first-stage experience regression to both the wage and reservation wage 
equations.  Columns (4) and (5) of Table 6 present the results.  The estimated return to 
experience is marginally significant and larger than its counterpart in column (3) of Table 
5.  At first glance this may seem surprising.  One of the reasons why experience may be 
endogenous in a wage regression is that past employment is positively correlated with 
past wages.  Persistent unobservables that cause higher wages should cause higher 
employment, in which case estimates that fail to account for such observables should 
                                                 
5  This is similar to the estimator proposed by Heckman (1976), except that the endogenous regressor is 
observed in the full sample in my case, whereas it was observed only in the self-selected sample in his.  See 
also Amemiya (1985, ch. 10) and Wooldridge (2003, ch. 16).   27 
yield upward biased estimates of the return to experience.  However, past employment is 
negatively correlated with past reservation wages, so if the unobservables that influence 
past wages are sufficiently correlated with past reservation wages, it is conceivable that 
estimates that fail to account for such correlation could be negatively biased.  Put 
differently, negative bias may arise if the current wage disturbance is more highly 
correlated with past reservation wage disturbances than with past wage disturbances, 
once current-period self-selection is accounted for. 
  The estimate corresponds to an annualized return to experience of roughly 13 
percent, which is above the range of returns reported above.  At the same time, the 
experience coefficient in column (4) of Table 6 is not significantly different from the 
experience coefficient in column (3) of Table 5, where experience is treated as exogenous 
given the control for sample selection bias.  Moreover, the Hausman test computed from 
the coefficients on the first-stage residuals shows there is little reason to favor the 
specification in columns (4) and (5) of Table 6 over that in columns (3) and (4) of Table 
5.  The coefficients on the first-stage residuals are about the same magnitude as their 
standard errors.  The F-statistic for the joint significance of both coefficients is 1.76 (p = 
0.41), failing to reject the null of no misspecification.  As suggested above, this may 
indicate that the unobservable characteristics that influence employment are dominated 
by time-invariant components, in which case the bivariate censoring model would largely 
account for the endogeneity of experience at the same time that it accounts for self-
selection into the labor force. 
  A reasonable question to ask is whether the estimated return to experience squares 
with the estimated effect of FTP.  Since FTP increased experience by one quarter over the   28 
four-year follow-up period, this calculation is easy to make.  Based on the estimated 
return to experience in column (3) of Table 5, one would expect FTP to have increased 
wages by about 1.4 percent.  This is lower than the 3.7 percent estimate of the effect of 
FTP reported in column (4) of Table 3, although it is within the confidence interval of 
that estimate. 
  C. Reservation Wages for Full-Time Work 
  One might object to the estimates above on the grounds that they treat the 
reported reservation wages as if they represented respondents’ shadow price of leisure, 
even though the questionnaire language asked respondents for the lowest wage under 
which they would accept full-time work.  If the full-time language were salient to 
respondents as they answered the question, the result could be a misspecified model, 
since the wage at which the respondent would accept full-time work should exceed the 
shadow price of leisure.  Table 7 presents estimates from a model that accounts for this 
possibility. 
  To produce the estimates in Table 7 I have altered the censoring rule so that only 
full-time workers who report  i i r w ³  are treated as non-limit observations.  This seems 
reasonable if we think of consumers as operating on an upward-sloping labor-supply 
curve, so that a high wage offer elicits full-time work, whereas a lower wage offer elicits 
at most part-time work.  Treating consumers who work part-time (as well as non-
workers) as limit observations amounts to treating them as if they received offers below 
the lowest wage for which they would accept full-time work, in accord with the language 
of the questionnaire item.   29 
  Panel A of Table 7 reports estimates of the effect of FTP on wages; panel B 
reports estimates of the return to experience.  In both cases I report OLS (and in panel B, 
linear IV) estimates based on the sample of full-time workers with  i i r w ³ for comparison 
purposes (estimates from the Heckman two-step approach are omitted for brevity).  The 
estimates are generally similar to their counterparts in Tables 3, 4 and 5.  However, they 
are less precisely estimated.  This is what one might expect if the language about full-
time work was not particularly salient to consumers as they formulated their responses to 
the reservation wage question.  In this case, one would prefer the more precise estimates 
in Tables 3, 4 and 5 to those in Table 7. 
V. Conclusions 
  The human-capital benefits of work provided an important rationale for welfare 
reform.  Yet little research has focused on the question of whether welfare reform has 
increased wages.  Data from a Florida welfare reform evaluation suggest that former 
welfare recipients enjoy returns to experience that are similar to those enjoyed by more 
general samples of young workers.  My best estimate is that each year of work increases 
future wages by about 5.6 percent.  Since FTP increased experience by about 3 months, 
this implies that FTP should have raised wages by 1.4 percent, on average.  Direct 
estimates indicate that FTP may have increased wages by 3.7 percent, although that 
estimate is imprecise enough to include 1.4 percent in its confidence interval.   
  To estimate the effects of reform and experience on wages, I have employed a 
novel approach based on reservation wage data to deal with the sample selection 
problem.  The approach exploits a simple model of labor supply.  Since the model 
predicts that the consumer will work if her wage exceeds her reservation wage,   30 
reservation wages provide censoring thresholds for non-workers which can be used to 
solve the selection problem.  Since the selection problem is so pervasive in labor market 
research, it is useful to discuss how the approach might be made more broadly applicable. 
  One useful step would be to relax the distributional assumptions that I have 
maintained.  An advantage of the reservation wage approach is that it eliminates the need 
for the often-controversial exclusion restrictions that are typically employed to identify 
self-selection models.  This benefit comes with a cost, however, in that I have imposed 
normality to derive my estimator.  This stands in contrast to much recent econometric 
work, which develops non-parametric estimators that presuppose the existence of a valid 
instrument (see, e.g., Pagan and Ullah 2005).  An important direction for future work on 
the reservation wage approach is to determine the extent to which potentially restrictive 
distributional assumptions can be relaxed. 
  At a more basic level, extending the applicability of the approach would require 
new data collection, since none of the ongoing surveys commonly used in labor market 
research currently collect data on reservation wages.  This seems to be more of an 
opportunity than a limitation.  One of the lessons of the analysis above is that, unless one 
can collect wage and reservation wage data without error, one would have to collect 
reservation wage data not just from non-workers, but from everyone in the sample.  The 
analysis above shows that collecting reservation wage data from non-workers alone, 
though intuitive, would not allow one to estimate wage equations consistently.   
  Furthermore, it seems likely that the extent of the measurement error could be 
reduced.  In the FTP survey, roughly one-third of the workers reported reservation wages 
in excess of their wages.  This is a substantial amount of error, but then, the reservation   31 
wage data were not collected for the purpose of solving the sample selection problem.  
Put differently, even when faced with complex questions involving hypothetical 
situations aimed at valuing health insurance, two-thirds of the workers provided 
reservation wage data that were consistent with economic theory.  Questions designed to 
elicit the textbook notion of a reservation wage presumably could do better. 
  Two recent advances in survey methodology seem particularly promising.  The 
first involves “unfolding brackets,” where respondents are queried about a decreasing 
sequence of reservation prices until they indicate one to be unacceptable.  This approach 
has been used to elicit information about future income expectations in the Health and 
Retirement Survey (Hurd 1999).  Anchoring the reservation wage brackets about the 
current wage may help to reduce the extent to which workers report reservation wages 
that exceed their wage.  Another approach would be to pose probabilistic questions 
regarding the likelihood that the respondent would find a given wage (again, within a 
sequence) acceptable.  Such probabilistic sequences have been used to elicit consumers’ 
expectations about future earnings, among other things (Dominitz and Manski 1991).  An 
appealing feature of this approach is that the reported probabilities could be incorporated 
directly into the likelihood used in estimation.  In sum, it seems it should be possible to 
obtain better data on reservation wages, which could provide a useful tool for labor 
market researchers who confront the sample selection problem.     32 
Appendix: Sample selection and the endogeneity of experience 
 
  To provide conditions under which accounting for selection bias also accounts for 
the endogeneity of experience requires some additional notation.  Specifically, I add time 
subscripts t to the model in Section III.A.  This does not imply the availability of panel 
data; the time subscript is needed to make explicit the link between current experience 
and past employment.  The date t should be thought of as the date of the four-year survey. 
The modified wage equation is given by  
it it it it u Z X w 1 1 1 1
* + + = d b                 (A1) 
where the variables in the model are the same as those discussed above. 
  To derive the needed conditions, write labor market experience Zit explicitly as 






j it it r w Z -
=
- ³ =￿ , where t-J represents the first 
period of the consumer’s working life and 1(A) is the indicator function, so 1(A) = 1 if A 
is true and 1(A) = 0 otherwise.   
  Now let X1it = X1i, u1it = u1i, and  * *
i it r r = .  At the beginning of the consumer’s 
career, when t-J = 1, Zi1 = 0, we have 
i i i u X w 1 1 1
*
1 + = b , 
and the consumer works if  * *
1 i i r w ³ .  Furthermore, if she works in period 1, then she 
works in all periods.  Conversely, if she does not work in period 1, she never works.  This 
means that experience is deterministic once the first-period employment decision is 
made, so solving the first-period selection problem also solves the endogeneity problem.    33 
But since experience is deterministic once first-period employment is known, solving the 
selection problem in any period is equivalent to solving it in the first period.     34 
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Table 1 











Age < 20  0.071  0.073  0.073  0.060 
Age 20-24  0.252  0.251  0.260  0.256 
Age 25-34  0.456  0.447  0.449  0.455 
Age 35-44  0.199  0.199  0.196  0.201 
Age 45 or over  0.033  0.029  0.021  0.020 
         
No diploma or GED  0.382  0.392  0.388  0.327 
Diploma or GED  0.527  0.530  0.537  0.591 
Post high school  0.062  0.055  0.053  0.062 
Education missing  0.029  0.023  0.023  0.019 
         
White  0.438  0.423  0.422  0.433 
Non-white  0.562  0.577  0.578  0.567 
         
Number of kids    2.12  2.16  2.04 
    (1.32)  (1.32)  (1.28) 
         
Received welfare, 
month 48 
0.117  0.135  0.127  0.055 
         
Experience (quarters)  9.80  10.52  10.91  13.09 
  (7.22)  (7.18)  (7.11)  (6.89) 
         
Employed, qtr. 16  0.487  0.536  0.567  0.716 
Employed, survey    0.592  0.620  1.000 
         
Reservation wage      6.45  6.73 
      (2.15)  (2.51) 
Wage         7.15 
        (3.16) 
         
Sample size  2,815  1,729  1,548  959 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. 
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Table 2 
Distribution of Wages and Reservation Wages Among Workers 
Percentile:  Mean  5  10  25  50  75  90  95 
Wage  7.15  4.38  5.15  5.50  6.27  7.90  10.70  12.50 
Reservation 
wage 
6.74  5.00  5.15  5.15  6.00  7.00  9.00  10.00 
Sample size is 959. 
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Table 3 
Estimates of the Effect of FTP on Wages Four Years After Random Assignment 
Estimator:  OLS  Heckman two-step  Singly-censored bivariate 
regression 


























Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Treatment dummy  -0.013  0.111  0.016  0.037  0.016 
  (0.025)  (0.066)  (0.115)  (0.020)  (0.012) 
           
Age < 20  0.050  -0.179  0.001  -0.037  -0.011 
  (0.056)  (0.137)  (0.203)  (0.047)  (0.024) 
           
Age 25-34  0.014  0.031  0.022  0.010  0.022 
  (0.031)  (0.081)  (0.048)  (0.025)  (0.014) 
           
Age 35-44  -0.039  0.024  -0.033  -0.024  -0.010 
  (0.037)  (0.102)  (0.051)  (0.031)  (0.018) 
           
Age 45 and over  0.080  -0.208  0.026  0.015  0.012 
  (0.092)  (0.234)  (0.241)  (0.072)  (0.042) 
           
No diploma, GED  -0.163  -0.372  -0.262  -0.191  -0.082 
  (0.027)  (0.070)  (0.390)  (0.022)  (0.012) 
           
Post high school  0.177  0.117  0.204  0.208  0.188 
  (0.052)  (0.157)  (0.122)  (0.045)  (0.026) 
           
Non-white  -0.053  -0.017  -0.057  -0.098  -0.049 
  (0.019)  (0.068)  (0.035)  (0.021)  (0.012) 
           
Number of kids  -0.018  -0.083  -0.040  -0.019  -0.005 
  (0.008)  (0.027)  (0.088)  (0.008)  (0.005) 
           
Inverse Mills ratio      0.467     
      (1.825)     
￿1        0.356   
        (0.009)   
           
￿2          0.226 
          (0.003) 
           
￿        0.553 
        (0.028) 
         
R-square/ln L  0.071      -527.8 
Sample size  959  1548  959  1,548 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  In addition to variables shown, all models include a missing-
education dummy.  41 
Table 4 
Linear Regression Estimates of the Return to Experience 




   
Employment 
sample 
   
Employment 
sample 
Variable    (1)    (3) 
Experience    0.0035    -0.0143 
    (0.0018)    (0.0292) 
         
Age < 20    0.054    0.028 
    (0.056)    (0.072) 
         
Age 25-34    0.015    0.014 
    (0.031)    (0.032) 
         
Age 35-44    -0.040    -0.033 
    (0.037)    (0.042) 
         
Age 45 and over    0.093    0.021 
    (0.092)    (0.153) 
         
No diploma, GED    -0.156    -0.192 
    (0.027)    (0.066) 
         
Post high school    0.179    0.173 
    (0.052)    (0.055) 
         
Non-white    -0.058    -0.030 
    (0.026)    (0.054) 
         
Number of kids    -0.018    -0.020 
    (0.010)    (0.011) 
         
R-square    0.074     
         
Sample size    959    959 
Notes: Dependent variable is log wage.  Standard errors in 
parentheses.  In addition to variables shown, all models include a 
missing-education dummy.  42 
Table 5 
Selectivity-Corrected Estimates of the Return to Experience 
Estimator:  Heckman two-step  Singly-censored bivariate 
regression 










Log wage  
 
Log wage  
Log reservation 
wage  
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Experience    0.0036  0.0139  0.0023 
    (0.0018)  (0.0015)  (0.0008) 
         
Treatment dummy  0.111       
  (0.066)       
         
Age < 20  -0.179  0.026  -0.016  -0.007 
  (0.137)  (0.073)  (0.043)  (0.024) 
         
Age 25-34  0.031  0.019  0.004  0.022 
  (0.081)  (0.033)  (0.024)  (0.014) 
         
Age 35-44  0.024  -0.037  -0.022  -0.009 
  (0.102)  (0.040)  (0.030)  (0.018) 
         
Age 45 and over  -0.208  0.064  0.078  0.023 
  (0.234)  (0.109)  (0.071)  (0.042) 
         
No diploma, GED  -0.372  -0.215  -0.151  -0.076 
  (0.070)  (0.095)  (0.022)  (0.013) 
         
Post high school  0.117  0.194  0.205  0.186 
  (0.157)  (0.061)  (0.044)  (0.026) 
         
Non-white  -0.017  -0.060  -0.117  -0.032 
  (0.068)  (0.028)  (0.021)  (0.012) 
         
Number of kids  -0.083  -0.031  -0.005  -0.005 
  (0.027)  (0.023)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
         
Inverse Mills ratio    0.276     
    (0.424)     
￿1      0.346   
      (0.009)   
￿2        0.226 
        (0.004) 
￿      0.555 
      (0.022) 
       
ln L      -480.6 
Sample size  1548  959  1,548 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  In addition to variables shown, all models include a 
missing-education dummy   43 
Note to Table 6: Standard errors in parentheses.  In addition to variables shown, all models include a missing-education 
dummy 
Table 6 
Selectivity-Corrected IV Estimates of the Return to Experience 
Estimator:  OLS (1st stage)  Heckman two-step with IV  Singly-censored bivariate 
regression with IV 















Log wage  
 
Log wage  
Log reservation 
wage  
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Experience      0.0148  0.0332  0.0154 
      (0.1079)  (0.0185)  (0.0107) 
           
Treatment dummy  1.069  0.111       
  (0.350)  (0.066)       
           
Experience residual        -0.019  -0.013 
        (0.019)  (0.011) 
           
Age < 20  -1.339  -0.179  0.020  -0.008  0.009 
  (0.739)  (0.137)  (0.091)  (0.045)  (0.028) 
           
Age 25-34  -0.255  0.031  0.026  0.009  0.026 
  (0.431)  (0.081)  (0.069)  (0.025)  (0.014) 
           
Age 35-44  -0.419  0.024  -0.027  -0.014  -0.003 
  (0.539)  (0.102)  (0.081)  (0.031)  (0.018) 
           
Age 45 and over  -4.435  -0.208  0.091  0.161  0.080 
  (1.262)  (0.234)  (0.296)  (0.107)  (0.062) 
           
No diploma, GED  -2.976  -0.372  -0.219  -0.094  -0.037 
  (0.375)  (0.070)  (0.118)  (0.059)  (0.034) 
           
Post high school  0.456  0.117  0.197  0.197  0.181 
  (0.609)  (0.157)  (0.081)  (0.044)  (0.027) 
           
Non-white  1.412  -0.017  -0.078  -0.144  -0.071 
  (0.362)  (0.068)  (0.257)  (0.033)  (0.019) 
           
Number of kids  -0.381  -0.083  -0.035  -0.007  0.000 
  (0.142)  (0.027)  (0.050)  (0.011)  (0.006) 
           
Inverse Mills ratio      0.467     
      (1.825)     
￿1        0.345   
        (0.009)   
￿2          0.226 
          (0.004) 
￿        0.555 
        (0.022) 
R-square  0.067         
Sample size  1548  1548  959  1548   44 
Table 7 
Estimates of the Effect of FTP on Wages and of the Return to Experience, Treating 
Reservation Wage Responses as Minimum Offers Needed to Induce Full-Time 
Work 
A: Effect of FTP         













   
Dependent variable:  Wage  Wage     
Variable  (1)  (2)     
Treatment-group dummy  0.020  0.029     
  (0.028)  (0.023)     
         
R-square/ lnL  0.131       
         
Sample size  466  1548     
         
         
B. Return to Experience         




















Dependent variable:  Wage  Wage  Wage  Wage 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Experience  0.0025  0.0154  0.0142  0.0260 
  (0.0021)  (0.0228)  (0.0015)  (0.0214) 
         
R-square/ lnL  0.133    -465.2   
         
Sample size  466  466  1548  1548 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  In addition to variables shown, all models include 
all variables shown in Table 3 plus a missing-education dummy.  The model in column 
(4) of panel B also includes the residual from the first stage regression.  Results for 
reservation wage equations in singly-censored bivariate regression models are not shown. 
 
 